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Trade barriers may improve welfare if property rights with respect to renewable natural resources are 
lacking. Previous studies focus on the role of overharvesting, but we argue that trade–induced habitat 
destruction should also be taken into account. Habitat is one of the key factors determining the long–
run viability of many natural resources, and economic activity oftentimes  goes at the  expense of 
habitat.  While  open  access  gives  rise  to  within–industry  externalities,  habitat  destruction  creates 
across–industry externalities. We identify under what circumstances trade liberalization is welfare–
enhancing  as  well  as  contributing  to  nature  conservation,  and  analyze  the  consequences  of  trade 
policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
  Is trade liberalization detrimental to welfare and resource conservation, if property rights with 
respect  to  resource  harvesting  are  not  well  enforced?  The  work  by  Brander  and  Taylor  [4,5,6] 
suggests the answer to this question is affirmative for those countries that are relatively well-endowed 
with natural resources. Opening up to trade gives them the opportunity to exploit their comparative 
advantage in producing the resource good by exporting it, so that they harvest even more excessively 
(from a social welfare perspective) than in autarky. In such a second–best situation, trade policies that 
reduce foreign demand for the resource commodity mitigate the within–industry externality arising 
from the lack of well enforced property rights, and hence may improve welfare.  
  However, the argument that restricting trade in resources improves resource conservation, is not 
undisputed. Excessive harvesting pressure certainly provides a threat to the long–run survival of many 
species that are traded internationally. More than 50% of the mammals, reptiles, birds and amphibians 
that are currently threatened by extinction, are so because of overharvesting [12, p. 41]. But according 
to the same source, habitat destruction also threatens the long–run viability of more than 50% of those 
species (see also [3,14,15,16]). Habitat destruction compresses a species’ population on a smaller 
piece of land. Competition for base resources such as food and water becomes more intense, resulting 
in a gradual decline of the resource population. This means that, by inducing a shift from resource 
harvesting towards a land–consuming economic activity, trade policies threaten rather than improve 
long–run  species  conservation  if  the  habitat–destruction  effect  dominates  the  effect  of  reduced 
harvesting pressure.  
  In this paper, we extend Brander and Taylor’s [6] two–country general equilibrium model to 
investigate  the  relationship  between  trade  in  a  habitat–dependent  natural  resource,  the  size  of  its 
habitat, and a land–consuming economic activity, agriculture. We include the agricultural sector in the 
model,  since  it  is  one  of  the  main  causes  of  habitat  destruction.
1  We  assume  that  agricultural 
expansion necessarily goes at the expense of habitat conservation through land conversion. The lack 
of  property  rights  with  respect  to  resource  harvesting  does  not  only  give  rise  to  within–industry 
externalities (i.e., overharvesting of the resource). It also gives rise to across–industry externalities as   3
incentives are lacking for farmers to take into account the negative impact of agricultural activity on 
resource conservation (via habitat destruction).  
  This paper is not the first to emphasize the relationship between habitat area and the long–run 
size  of the resource  stock in the economics literature.  Swallow  [14,15] analyzes socially  optimal 
exploitation of (irreversible) habitat and a renewable resource, and Bulte and Horan [7] analyze the 
interaction  between  habitat  and  open–access  resource  harvesting  in  a  single–country  partial 
equilibrium framework. Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the interaction between 
resource harvesting and habitat destruction in a three–sector general equilibrium framework, and by 
allowing for the within– and across–industry externalities described above. We identify the conditions 
under which trade liberalization improves both domestic welfare as well as the conservation of a 
habitat–dependent natural resource.  
  Habitat size and international trade are linked through two main channels in our model. First, 
the abundance of the traded species depends positively on habitat size through its impact on the 
carrying capacity of the resource. Here, habitat can be thought of in a strict sense (a specific type of 
ecosystem) or, more loosely, as unclaimed land. Which interpretation is valid, depends on the species 
under consideration. Some species require a specific type of habitat for their survival. This holds for 
the tiger [9], but also for offshore marine fisheries (including shrimp) where individual species depend 
on the conservation of coastal estuarine wetland systems that serve as breeding grounds [2]. For these 
species, competition for space between nature and man is most obvious. But all species require base 
resources (such as water and fodder) to survive, and the availability of these resources ultimately 
depends on the area of land that is accessible to wildlife, which roughly coincides with uncultivated 
land. Here, elephants are an example in point [11]. Habitat destruction thus reduces the long–run 
viability of the natural resource, as well as its rate of growth: for a given population size, a decrease in 
habitat reduces the natural rate of regeneration. 
  The second link between habitat destruction and trade in our model operates through search 
costs, which affect the international competitiveness of resource harvesting industries. Reduction in 
habitat  size  does  not  result  in  the  instantaneous  demise  of  most  terrestrial  mammals,  but  their 
populations become compressed on a smaller area and hence individuals are easier to spot by hunters.   4
The  reduced  search  costs  increase  the  profitability  of  resource  harvesting  activity.  Hence,  if 
agriculture expands, it imposes externalities on the harvesting sector through habitat destruction. In 
the short run because it makes wildlife easier to catch (an economic across–industry externality), in 
the long run because it reduces the population of wildlife that can be caught (an ecological across–
industry externality).  
  Conservation  of  traded  species  is  not  the  only  reason  why  the  impact  of  trade  and  trade 
measures on habitat needs to be analyzed. Habitat also provides base resources for species that are not 
being traded internationally. These species may be valuable because of their genetic information or 
other types of use and non–use values. As is known from the island biogeography literature, the 
number of species living in a particular habitat is a positive function of the size of the habitat itself  
[10]. We take into account the role of habitat for biodiversity by analyzing the consequences of trade 
liberalization and trade policy on habitat size and long–run resource stocks in our model. These two 
variables serve as indicators of conservation, which matters from a global welfare perspective. We 
contrast conservation to consumer welfare derived from goods consumption.  
    The outline of the paper is as follows. In the second section, we introduce the model. In the 
third we study the autarky situation, which enables us to explore the consequences of free trade in the 
fourth section. The trade policy implications are derived in the fifth section, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The model 
  There are two countries, Home and Foreign. There are three types of consumer commodities: 
agricultural products, a manufactured good, and a natural resource commodity. The production of 
each good requires labor as well as a sector–specific input. Agricultural production requires land, 
manufacturing requires capital, and resource harvesting depends on the resource stock. Labor earns a 
wage  and  capital  a  rent,  but  land  and  resources  are  not  paid  for.  Rent  dissipation  occurs  in  the 
resource harvesting industry because of the lack of property rights. Land is assumed to be private 
property, but as we assume land not to be scarce in a strict economic sense, it is not paid for either. 
We assume the two countries to differ only with respect to input endowments; their technologies and   5
preferences  are  identical.  Therefore,  we  do  not  distinguish  between  the  two  countries  until  we 
describe trade (sections 4 and 5). 
 
2.1  Supply side  
  Agricultural production, ya, requires labor,  a l , and land,  a h , as perfectly complementary inputs. 
Land and labor are scaled such that efficient input use implies that one unit of agricultural output 
requires one unit of land and one unit of labor: 
 
(2.1)   min{ , } a a a y l h = . 
 
Each country’s land endowment (h) is assumed to exceed its labor endowment (l), so that land is 
sufficiently abundant: it never becomes a limiting factor in agriculture. Therefore, land does not earn a 
rent. Unclaimed land can instantaneously be converted into agricultural land at zero conversion cost. 
Hence,  unit  production  cost  of  agricultural  goods  equals  the  wage  rate,  w.  In  a  competitive 
equilibrium with la > 0 the market price of agricultural products,  a p , equals the wage rate:  a p w = . 
  Manufactured commodities are produced using labor,  m l , and a fixed factor, k, for example 




m m l k y
- =
1 ,  with  1 0 < <h . 
 
Profit maximization gives: 
 
(2.3)   
1/(1 ) ( / ) m m l p w k
- =
h h , 
 
where pm is the price of the manufactured commodity. Profits then equal (1 – h)pmym.   6
  We define habitat, hr, as the area of land that is not used for agriculture: hr = h – ha.
2 Since in 
equilibrium one unit of labor employs one unit of land, la = ha, it holds that:  
 
(2.4)    a r l h h - = . 
 
  The supply of resource commodities is given by an extended Schaefer harvesting production 
function. The productivity of harvesting effort,  , r l  is determined by resource stock density (the ratio 
of the resource population size, s , to habitat area, hr), and a ‘catchability coefficient’, a (> 0): 
 
(2.5)    ( / ) r r r y s h l = a . 
 
The harvesting function extends the Schaefer function for spatial considerations. The size of habitat 
negatively affects harvest  via its impact on search costs. One interpretation is that if agricultural 
activity expands (and hence habitat is smaller), a population of a given size lives on a smaller area and 
individuals are easier to spot; catch per unit of labor effort goes up. A second interpretation is that if 
agriculture expands, infrastructure is developed which may also be used to exploit natural resources. 
For example, roads facilitate access to previously inaccessible land areas and hence enhance open 
access [13]. 
  The natural resource is harvested under open access. The lack of property rights implies that 
producers only face labor cost and earn zero profits, so that (in case  0 > r l ) the market price of the 
resource equals average labor costs: 
 
(2.6)    / r r p wh s = a . 
 
Note that the resource price is inversely related to stock density  r h s/ .   7
  The natural resource stock changes over time because of natural growth and harvesting. The 
natural growth of the total resource stock depends positively on habitat size. This is captured by:  
 
(2.7)    (1 / ) r r s s s h y = - -  r , 
 
where  r  is the maximum growth rate of the resource.
3 This equation implies that the maximum 
population size – the size it will obtain in the absence of harvesting – is proportional to habitat size.  
  Labor supply is inelastic at l, which implies the following in a full–employment equilibrium:  
 
(2.8)    l l l l r m a = + + . 
 
2.2  Demand side 




r m a r m a c c c c c c u
g g g = ) , , ( , 
 
with  i c  denoting consumption of commodity  i  ( r m a i , , =  for the agricultural, manufactured and 
resource commodity, respectively) and  1. a m r + + = g g g  The Cobb–Douglas structure implies that 
spending on each of the three goods is a fixed fraction of nominal national income,  y :  
 
(2.10)  i i i p c y = g ,   ( r m a i , , = ). 
 
Nominal  national  income  is  the  sum  of  labor  income  and  profits  in  the  manufacturing  sector, 
(1 ) m m y wl p y = + -h . From (2.2)–(2.3), we have  m m m wl p y =h  so that we may write: 
 
(2.11)    ] / ) 1 ( [ h h - + = m l l w y .   8
 
Since rents to capital increase with employment in manufacturing, national income increases with lm.  
 
2.3  Main driving forces behind conservation and welfare 
  To identify how habitat destruction and resource harvesting affect conservation and welfare, we 
analyze how changes in labor allocation in general affect our main variables of interest, which are 
habitat, the size of the resource stock, and consumer welfare. Sections 4 and 5 will narrow down the 
analysis to two specific changes in labor allocation, viz. changes caused by trade liberalization and 
trade policy, respectively.  
  Due to competition for space, an expansion of agriculture reduces habitat size ( r a dh dl = - ). 
Habitat destruction and intensification of harvesting reduce resource stocks: in a steady state with 
constant  labor  allocation,  the  long–run  resource  stock  is  constant  at  level  ( / ) r r s h l ¥ ¥ ¥ = - a r , 
where the subscript  ¥ refers to the steady state. Together with the labor market constraint, we can 
write:  
 
(2.12)    1 a m s h l l l ¥ ¥ ¥
æ ö




, and  
 
(2.13)   1 1
a m r
r r a
l l l s l
h h h l
¥ ¥ ¥ ¥
¥ ¥ ¥
æ ö æ ö - -





Based on (2.12) we can state   
 
Proposition 2.1. (Conservation and labor allocation) 
(i)  0 / | ( )
m a dl sign ds dl sign
¥ ¥ ¥ = = - a r . 
(ii)  0 / | 0
a m dl ds dl
¥ ¥ ¥ = > . 
   9
For given la, an increase in manufacturing results in a larger steady–state resource stock since it comes 
at the cost of harvesting effort without affecting habitat. For given  ¥ m l , expansion of agricultural 
activity reduces the stock through reducing habitat, but increases it through leaving less labor for 
harvesting. On balance, the stock rises with agricultural expansion if and only if the productivity of 
harvesting effort (a) is large relative to the sensitivity of natural growth to habitat (r). Then, the 
within–industry externality (the effect of excess harvesting on the long–run stock, as measured by a) 
is less severe than the across–industry externality (the effect of habitat destruction on the stock, as 
reflected by r).  
  Habitat and resource stocks affect consumer welfare through affecting the resource price. In 
equilibrium,  consumer  welfare  depends  on  income  and  prices  according  to 
( / ) ( / ) ( / )
a m r
a a r r m m u y p p p =
g g g g g g . Let us assume that labor is employed in all three sectors. In 
that case, we can substitute income and prices – using pa = w, (2.3), (2.6), and (2.11) – to arrive at the 
following expression for welfare: 
 
(2.14)    ( ) ( )
(1 )
[( ) ][ (1 )/ ] / /
m r m a r
m a r m m r u l l k l s h
-
= + -
g h g g g g hg g g h h a . 
 
For a fixed labor input in manufacturing, national income, the price of agricultural products, and the 
price of manufactured commodities are fixed in terms of the agricultural good. Therefore in that case 
only the price of the harvested commodity matters. This observation allows us to characterize the 
relationship between welfare and conservation as follows:  
 
Proposition 2.2 (Welfare and stock density) 
0 / ( / ) 0
m r dl du d s h
= >  if  0 a l >  and  0 r l > . 
 
Ceteris paribus, a larger resource stock is good for consumer welfare, but a larger habitat size hurts it. 
Net, a higher stock density (s/hr) boosts welfare since it lowers the cost of supplying harvested goods.   10
Through this channel, within– and across–industry externalities link conservation and welfare. The 
absence  of  property  rights  with respect to  resource  harvesting implies that  from  a  social welfare 
perspective,  the  steady–state  resource  stock  is  suboptimally  small,  which  hurts  consumer  welfare 
through high harvesting costs.  
  The within–industry externality may be exacerbated by the across–industry externalities that 
agriculture imposes on harvesting. The lack of property rights with respect to the resource implies that 
land owners ignore the impact of their land allocation decisions on long–run resource stocks; they 
may allocate too much of their land to agriculture, which impairs resource growth and hence may 
result in smaller long–run resource stocks. This is the ecological across–industry externality. In the 
short run, however, an expansion of agriculture provides a positive externality on the resource sector 
because for given resource stocks, a decrease in habitat reduces search costs. This is the economic 
across–industry externality.  
  Although  the  two  across–industry  externalities work  in  opposite  directions, in  the long run 
agricultural expansion unambiguously raises consumer welfare
4 through increasing the long–run stock 
density (s/hr), as follows from (2.13). Also, for a given labor input in agriculture, industrial expansion 
boosts welfare. This is stated in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 2.3 (Long–run welfare and labor allocation) 
0 / 0
m a dl du dl
¥ ¥ ¥ = >  and 
0 / 0
a m dl du dl
¥ ¥ ¥ = > . 
 
  To clarify the role of habitat effects in our model, it is instructive to first take a look at a special 
two–sector version of the model in which habitat effects vanish, then introduce habitat effects in a 
two–sector setting, and finally introduce a third sector.  
  We start by omitting the agricultural sector – which implies that habitat is constant (hr = h) – 
and by assuming constant returns to scale in manufacturing ( ) 1 = h . This is the Brander and Taylor 
[6] model. Expression (2.14) for welfare then becomes 
r r m h s l u r m
g g g a g g ) / ( ) ( ) ( = . Therefore, an   11
increase in harvesting effort reduces the long–run resource stock, so that long–run welfare falls. The 
result is that resource depletion and welfare losses go together. 
  A key insight from introducing habitat effects is that the country that specializes in harvesting 
suffers a welfare loss, but not necessarily a loss in its long–run resource stock. We can introduce 
habitat effects by maintaining a two–sector structure, but replacing the manufacturing sector by the 
agricultural sector. This implies the special case of our model with gm = 0 so that lm = 0. In this case, a 
resource producing country that increases harvesting effort reduces agriculture ( 0 > - = a r dl dl ; see 
(2.8)). Therefore, habitat expands, which results in a decrease in stock density both immediately and 
in the long run (see (2.13)). Expression From (2.14) reduces to  ( ) ( ) ( / )
a r r
a r r u l s h =
g g g g g a and we 
see that welfare must fall in the short and long run. Thus, the two–sector model with agriculture and 
habitat generates  a similar welfare result as in Brander and Taylor’s [6] model. The results with 
respect to the resource stock are different, though. If a < r, an increase in harvesting comes at the cost 
of agriculture, which increases habitat and enhances conservation of the resource stock.  
  Finally, in the three–sectors case, we find that specialization in resource harvesting may even 
raise both consumer welfare and resource conservation. With three sectors, an increase in harvesting 
may produce either a decrease or an increase in agriculture – and hence an increase or decrease in 
habitat,  respectively  –  depending  on  what  happens  to  manufacturing  labor.  By  the  labor  market 
constraint, we have  a r m dl dl dl = - - . If the increase in harvesting is accompanied by a decrease in 
manufacturing, agriculture may expand, which hurts habitat in contrast to what happens in the two 
two–sector models just discussed. In the long run, stock density s/hr increases (see (2.13)), which 
increases welfare (provided it is not dominated by losses from reduced manufacturing). This is in 
contrast to what happens in the two–sector models.  
  So far we have studied conservation and welfare for given labor allocation. The next sections 
determine labor allocation endogenously under autarky, free trade and trade policy respectively.  
 
3.  Equilibrium in autarky   12
  In autarky, all three goods are produced and consumed,  ) , , ( 0 r m a i c y i i = > = . We take the 
agricultural commodity as the numéraire ( 1 = a p ), which implies  1 = w . The autarky labor allocation 
over the three sectors depends on preference parameters and on the labor cost share in manufacturing, 
h, according to the following expressions:
5  
 
 (3.1)   ,
AUT
a a l l =  g
AUT
r r l l =  g ,  ,
AUT
m m l l =  hg  
 
where  /[1 (1 )] i i m º - -  g g g h  for i = a,m,r and AUT denotes autarky.  
  Whereas labor allocation is constant over time, the resource stock may change over time. From 
(2.5), (2.7), and (3.1), we find that its steady state value in autarky is equal to: 
 
(3.2)  ( / )
AUT
a r s h l ¥ = - +   g g a r . 
 
Hence, countries with a large endowment of land, h, relative to labor, l, sustain a large steady state 




a p =  
1 ( / )
AUT
m m p l k
- - = 
h h h g , and 
/ 1













a g g a r
. 
 
where the resource price follows from (2.13), (3.1) and (2.6). Comparing two countries that differ in 
endowments, the country with highest land to labor ratio sells the resource at the lowest relative price. 
 
4.  Free trade  
  We now study what happens if two similar countries, referred to as Home and Foreign, open up 
goods trade. We assume that when trade starts, say at time T , resource stocks are at their autarky 
steady–state equilibrium. The two countries differ only with respect to factor endowments k, h and l 
and therefore also with respect to their autarky steady–state resource stocks. All other parameters are   13
identical across  the  countries.  Without loss of  generality, we furthermore assume  that  Foreign  is 
relatively well endowed with land. Thus, using asterisks to denote parameters and variables that are 
specific to Foreign, we assume 
* * / / 1 l h l h < < . As is clear from equation (3.3), this assumption 
implies that just before opening up to trade, the resource harvesting cost in Home exceeds the one in 
Foreign.  Finally,  we  assume  that  both  countries  always  engage  in  agriculture.  This  assumption 
facilitates the analysis, as it implies that wage rates are equal in the two countries. The simplest way 
to ensure this is to assume that aggregate demand for agricultural goods is too large to be produced by 
a single country: 
* * * max{ /( ), /( )} a l l l l l l > + +  g . 
  From now on, the superscript w denotes aggregates over the two countries (
* w x x x º +  for any 
x). The superscript FT refers to free trade, which will be suppressed when there is no danger of 
confusion.  
   
4.1.  Determination of the free trade equilibrium 
  Since  both  countries  produce  the  agricultural  good,  they  charge  the  same  price  for  this 
numeraire good and wages equalize,  1
* = =
FT FT w w . It follows that aggregate income equals:
6 
 














g h g h ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 1
* *
.    
 
Aggregate  income  in  terms  of  agricultural  goods  does  not  differ  between  autarky  and  free  trade 
because of wage equalization and the Cobb–Douglas structure. With wage equalization, labor income 
in terms of agricultural goods remains constant ( /
w w
a wl p l = ). The Cobb–Douglas specification of 
the utility and manufacturing production function implies constant value shares, so that rent income is 
a fixed fraction of labor income, and also remains constant in terms of agricultural goods.
7   14
  Equilibrium in the market for good i ( ) , , r m a i =  requires that total revenue for producers in 
each  market  equals  international  consumer  spending  on  the  good  ( )
w w w




a a l w wl y p + =  and using pa = w = w
* = 1, the labor allocation in agriculture satisfies: 
 
(4.2)   
* w
a a a l l l = -  g . 
 
  In  free  trade,  both  countries  produce  positive  amounts  of  the  manufactured  good  (since 
1 0 < <h ). Wages are equalized and therefore profit maximization implies 
* * / / k k l l m m = . Together 
with (2.3) this implies that the manufactured goods market clears if 
* ( )/
w w
m m m m l l y l + = =  h g g . 
Hence, in equilibrium, we have: 
 
(4.3)    m m l zl =  hg ; 
* * *
m m l z l =  hg , 
 
where   ( / )/( / )
w w z k l k l º  and 
* * * ( / )/( / )
w w z k l k l º , which reflect relative abundance of capital 
per unit of labor in Home and Foreign, respectively. Hence, the country relatively well endowed with 
capital exports manufactured goods, that is Home (Foreign) exports if z > 1 > z* (z* > 1 > z).
8   
  Regarding  harvesting  there  might  occur  a  shared  harvesting  regime  (SHR),  where  both 
countries harvest the resource, with equal unit harvest costs, or a concentrated harvesting regime 
(CHR),  where  only  Foreign  harvests,  at  lower  unit  costs  than  Home.
9  Harvest  cost  equalization 
implies that stock densities are equal across countries, see (2.6). Hence, in a shared harvest regime, 
0 > r l ,  0
* > r l  and 
* * / / r r h h s s = . Substituting (2.4) and (2.8) to eliminate hr and lr respectively, we 
find for a shared harvest regime: 
 









* * * , a m a m l l l l l l < - < - .  
   15
Similarly, in a concentrated harvest regime, we have: 
 









* * * , a m a m l l l l l l = - < - . 
 
From (4.2)–(4.5), we can solve for 
FT
m l , 
*FT
m l , 
FT
a l , and 
*FT
a l  for given s and s* to characterize the 
short–run  free–trade  equilibrium.  Using  the  solution  for  long–run  resource  stocks,  see  (2.12),  to 
eliminate  s  and  s*,  we  can  solve  for  the  same  variables  to  characterize  the  long–run  free–trade 
equilibrium. In the sequel we compare the short–run and long–run free–trade equilibria to the autarky 
equilibrium to characterize the effects of international trade on three key variables, namely habitat, the 
resource stock (only for the long run) and welfare. 
 
4.2  The short–run consequences of trade liberalization 
  This section deals with the short–run effects of opening up to trade, starting from steady state 
autarky.  The  results  depend  on  whether  the  short–run  equilibrium  is  a  shared  or  concentrated 
harvesting  regime.  The  latter  arises  if  autarky  steady–state  resource  stocks  imply  that  Home’s 
producer price of the resource exceeds Foreign’s producer price, even if Home allocates no labor to 
harvesting.  
  On the short–run consequences of trade liberalization for habitat, we can state the following:  
 
Proposition 4.1 (Short–run habitat) 




r = . 
) (ii   0 ) ( > T l
FT
r  and  0 ) (
* > T l
FT




r <  and  ) ( ) (




r > . 
) (iii   0 ) ( = T l
FT
r  and  0 ) (
* > T l
FT
r  implies  ( ) ( )
FT AUT
r r h T h T >  and 
* * ( ) ( )
FT AUT
r r h T h T <  if and only 
if  ( 1) r m z < - g hg .  
   16
As aggregate income (measured in terms of agricultural goods) remains unchanged and a constant 
share of income is spent on agricultural goods, aggregate demand for agricultural goods does not 
change.  Opening  up  to  trade  may  affect  the  allocation  of  agricultural  production  over  the  two 
countries, but does not affect the total land area devoted to agriculture. Consequently total habitat 
remains unchanged. 
  The formal proof of the second and third part of the proposition is provided in the appendix. 
The intuition of the second part is as follows. In autarky, Home has higher unit harvest costs than 
Foreign.  If  trade  liberalization  makes  both  countries  engage  in  harvesting  and  have  equal  unit 
harvesting costs, Home’s harvest cost must fall, and, with a fixed short–run resource stock,  this can 
only be accomplished through a fall in habitat since this lowers search costs. 
  The opposite, a decrease (increase) in Foreign (Home’s) habitat, can only occur if Home stops 
harvesting after trade liberalization. Only if all labor previously allocated to harvesting shifts to the 
production of manufactured goods (rather than to agriculture), habitat destruction can be avoided. 
This requires that Home has a large comparative advantage in manufacturing (z large) and that there is 
a large market for these goods (gm large). In contrast, if there is no trade in manufactured goods or if 
home imports these goods ( 1 z £ ), free trade reduces home’s habitat.  
  Next we consider the effect of opening up to trade on welfare.  
 
Proposition 4.2 (Short run welfare). 
(i)  ) ( ) ( T u T u
AUT FT > . 
(ii)  )] ( ) ( [
* * T u T u sign
AUT FT -  is ambiguous, but       
(iii)  ) ( ) (
* * T u T u
AUT FT >  if  ) ( ) (




r < . 
 
See the appendix for the proof. Home gains from trade in the short run since it imports harvested 
resources at a price lower than its autarky price. Moreover it gains from trade in manufactured goods, 
since the manufacturing sector is not riddled with externalities. The latter applies to Foreign, too, but 
the across–industry externality between agriculture and harvesting may make Foreign suffer. If its   17
habitat  falls  through  agricultural  expansion,  search  costs  in  harvesting  are  lower,  which  boosts 
welfare. However, as stated in proposition 4.1, trade may instead raise habitat. If in this case the 
higher harvesting search costs are not completely offset by gains from trade in manufactured goods, 
Foreign welfare falls. Note that if there were no trade in manufacturing ( ) 1 = z
10, foreign would 
always lose from opening up to trade. 
 
4.3  The long–run effects of opening up to trade 
  Following the instantaneous reallocations as a result of opening up to trade, resource stocks start 
adjusting towards a new long–run level. This transition has an impact on harvest costs and trade 
patterns. In the long run, both countries harvest. Any country that does not harvest would end up with 
the highest possible stock density: s/hr = 1 (see (2.13)). Therefore, its harvesting costs would be lower 
than those of the other country (which does harvest), and hence harvesting would be profitable.  
  We first show that aggregate habitat is not affected in the long run. We also derive a necessary 
and sufficient condition for per country habitats to increase or decrease.  
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Result (i) has the same proof and intuition as proposition 4.1(i). The appendix gives the proof of (ii). 
In autarky, Home has higher harvesting costs, and hence will withdraw labor from resource harvesting 
when opening up to trade. This will shift labor into the agricultural sector, unless Home becomes a 
large exporter of manufactured goods. If Home is relatively abundant in capital (low 
* z ) and demand 
for  manufacturing is  relatively  high  (high  m g ), Home is likely to  shift labor from agriculture to 
manufacturing so that habitat increases. In contrast, without trade in manufactured goods (z* = 1), 
Home pays for resource imports by exporting agricultural goods, which comes at the cost of habitat.    18
  Next we deal with the resource stock.  
 
Proposition 4.4 (Long–run resource stocks). 
) (i
AUTw FTw s s ¥ ¥ = . 
) (ii
FT AUT s s ¥ ¥ < and 
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The first part of the proposition follows from the result that trade only shifts employment in each of 
the sectors from one country to the other without affecting aggregate employment in each of the 
sectors. Aggregate harvesting employment remains unchanged as well as aggregate habitat. Since the 
aggregate steady–state resource stock depends on aggregate habitat and employment in harvesting, 
trade does not affect this stock in the long run.  
  The  proof  of  the  second  part  of  the  proposition  is  given  in  the  appendix.  The  inequality 
condition  allows  us  to  separate  the  role  of  externalities  (on  the  LHS)  and  that  of  manufacturing 
exports (on the RHS). We identify three cases in which, in contrast to the results obtained by Brander 
and Taylor [6], trade liberalization reduces the resource–exporter’s resource stock. 
  First, if  1
* = z , manufactured goods are not traded and manufacturing employment is the same 
as in autarky. Hence, we can apply proposition 2.1 with dlm = 0. Home imports the resource and 
destroys habitat to expand agriculture for exports, and the opposite happens in Foreign. The increase 
in Foreign’s habitat raises its resource stock if r > a, as explained in section 2.3.  
  Second, if  1
* < z , Foreign imports manufactured goods. Then, the sign of the RHS is positive, 
but since the term in square brackets is positive, the sign of the LHS is also positive if r > a. Hence, if 
Foreign  imports  manufactured  goods,  Foreign’s  stock  can  only  increase  if  across–industry 
externalities dominate within–industry externalities (r > a) and if the market for harvested resources 
is  large  (gr  large).  In  this  case,  Foreign  reallocates  labor  from  manufacturing  and  agriculture  to 
resource harvesting, which boosts the stock through the effect of expanded habitat on natural growth.    19
  Third, if  1
* > z , Foreign reduces agricultural activity mainly to expand manufacturing rather 
than harvesting activity, so that habitat increases substantially relative to harvesting effort. That means 
that even if r < a (that is, if the within–externality dominates), the net impact on the resource stock 
may be positive.  
  Finally we address the long–run welfare consequences of trade liberalization.
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Proposition 4.5 (Long–run welfare). 
(i) 
FT AUT u u ¥ ¥ > . 
(ii)  ] [
* * AUT FT u u sign ¥ -  is ambiguous, but 
(iii) 
* * FT AUT u u ¥ ¥ <  if 
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Trade equalizes long–run harvest costs in the two countries. Hence, stock densities  r h s/  are the same 
in both countries and equal to the world stock ratio, which is the same in free trade and autarky. In 
autarky, Home has high harvest cost and low stock density. As a result trade lowers its long–run 
harvest costs and Home gains. In contrast to the results obtained by Brander and Taylor [6], Foreign’s 
welfare may increase, only if the gains from trade in manufacturing are large enough to offset the 
losses from the increases in harvesting costs (as shown numerically in the appendix).  
 
5.  Policy analysis: Taxation of the resource commodity imports by Home 
  In this section we explore how the key variables habitat, the resource stock and welfare are 
affected when Home levies a tariff on its resource imports. The tariff reduces profitability of resource 
harvesting in Foreign. This has two consequences. First, it mitigates the within–industry externalities 
arising from the absence of property rights (cf. Brander and Taylor [6]). Second, it shifts labor away 
from resource harvesting and hence may stimulate the land–consuming economic activity, agriculture. 
Therefore, it may exacerbate the across–industry externality that operates through habitat destruction.  
  We assume that Home introduces an ad–valorem tariff on its resource commodity imports in the 
long–run free–trade equilibrium and that the tariff is positive but close enough to zero, so that we can   20
analyze  marginal  deviations  from  the  free–trade  equilibrium.  For  expositional  purposes,  we  also 
assume that Foreign has no manufacturing production and that rents to capital can be ignored. We 
arrive  at  this  situation  by  assuming  0
* = k   and  1 ® h .  We  finally  assume  that  Home  is  a  net 
resource  importer  in  the  steady–state  free–trade  equilibrium  (that  is 
/ 0 r r r r r y p y l l º - = - > G g g ); otherwise, the tariff would not be effective. One way to guarantee 
this result is by assuming that
* * ( / / )( / )
w
m h l h l l l < - g .  
  Let t denote the ad–valorem tariff on resource imports in Home and let  r p  (
*
r p ) denote the 
resource price paid by a consumer in Home (Foreign). Cross–border arbitrage implies: 
 
(5.1)   
* ) 1 ( r r p p t + = .  
 
In  Home,  national  income  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  its  labor  income  and  the  import  revenues, 
( )
* * / r r r r r y wl p wl p y p y = + = + - t G t g . Taking into account that w = 1,  r r r l y p =  (zero-profit 
condition) and using (5.1), Home’s income is  ( )/(1 (1 )) r r r y l l l = + - + - t g t g . Because Foreign’s 
income equals labor income (
* * l y = ), aggregate income (in terms of agricultural goods) equals: 
 
(5.2)    ( )/(1 (1 ))
w w
r r r y l l l = + - + - t g t g .  
 
Aggregate income decreases with lr: the more of the resource commodity is produced by Home, the 
smaller the imports from Foreign and hence the smaller the import tariff revenues. 
  Together  with  (5.1)  and  (5.2),  our  assumptions  that  0
* = k   and  1 ® h   imply  that  in 
equilibrium 
* w
a a a l l y + = g  (cf. (4.2)), and 
w
m m l y =g , 
* 0 m l =  (cf. (4.3)). Zero profits in the harvest 
sector imply that domestic prices equal domestic unit harvest costs  / r wh sa . Together with w = 1, 
this allows us to write (5.1) as: 
   21












5.1  The short–run consequences of Home levying a resource import tax 
  In this subsection we derive the immediate effects of the tariff on habitat and welfare, that is 
keeping the resource stocks at their free–trade steady–state level. The symbol  x D  will denote the 
instantaneous change in variable x as a result of the marginal tariff t. We first deal with habitat. 
 
Proposition 5.1 (Tariff’s short–run impact on habitat).  
) (i   0 < D
w
r h . 
(ii)  0 , 0
* < D > D r r h h . 
 
The  import  tariff  has  two  direct  consequences.  First,  it  shifts  Home’s  demand  from  imported 
resources to domestically harvested resources. Therefore Home’s harvesting activity expands whereas 
Foreign  harvesting  falls  0 , 0 (
* < D > D r r l l ).  Second,  the  tariff  raises  the  price  of  harvested 
commodities  relative  to  manufactured  goods,  so  that  demand  for  Home’s  manufactured  goods 
increases (from (5.2), 
w
m m y l g = , and evaluating at t = 0, we have  0 m m l = > D g G ). Therefore, 
producers in Home reallocate labor from agriculture to harvesting and manufacturing, which boosts 
Home’s habitat. The higher resource price also shifts relative demand to agriculture and aggregate 
land  use  expands  at  the  cost  of  aggregate  habitat  (from  (5.2)  and 
* w
a a a l l y + = g   we  have 

w w
r a a h l - = = > g G ).  
  Next we state the welfare consequences.  
 
Proposition 5.2 (Tariff’s short–run impact on welfare).  
(i)  sign u  is ambiguous. 
(ii) 
*
 u > .   22
 
  The increase (decrease) in habitat in Home (foreign) reduces per unit harvest costs in Foreign 
relative to Home. Therefore, while imported resource commodities become relatively more expensive 
in Home because of the tariff, they become relatively less expensive due to lower search costs. In the 
new equilibrium, Foreign remains an exporter of harvested resources. The increased stock density in 
Foreign results in a welfare improvement. Home receives the tariff revenues, but also experiences an 
increase in the costs of resource harvesting and hence its net welfare change is undetermined.  
 
5.2  The long–run consequences of Home levying a resource import tax 
  In the long run, the resource stocks have adjusted to their steady state level. The consequences 
of the tariff on habitat can now be formalized ( ¥ Dx  denotes the long–run change in variable  x ).  
 
Proposition 5.3 (Tariff’s impact on long–run habitat).  
) (i   0
w
r h ¥ D < . 
(ii) sign r h ¥ D  is ambiguous, 
* 0 r h ¥ D < . 
 
Thus, as compared to the steady state free trade equilibrium, agriculture in Foreign increases and 
harvesting activity falls, since the tariff reduces exports of harvested goods to Home. In the latter 
country, the tariff has an ambiguous impact on agriculture. On the one hand, as was the case in the 
short run, it reallocates labor to the harvesting and manufacturing sectors, at the cost of agriculture. 
On the other hand, the resource stock changes in the long run, which affects the allocation of labor. 
  Next, we can determine the circumstances under which Foreign’s resource stock increases. 
 
Proposition 5.4 (Tariff’s impact on long–run resource conservation).  
) (i   0 > D ¥
w s  Û ( )/ m a > - g g r a a . 
) (ii   0
* > D ¥ s Û   . a r <     23
 
The  tariff  only  results  in unambiguously  larger  resource  stocks in Foreign  if  the  within–industry 
externality (reflected by a higher productivity parameter a) is more severe than the across–industry 
externalities (associated with habitat destruction, the importance of which depends on r). The tariff is 
effective in reducing harvesting in Foreign, but since it also destroys habitat through agricultural 
expansion,  the  stock  only  increases  if  habitat  destruction  has  relatively  small  effects  on  natural 
growth. A similar trade–off exists in Home where harvesting activities are increased, but this impact 
is mitigated because of the increase in demand for manufactured goods. At the aggregate level, the 
bigger the shift to manufacturing relative to the shift to agriculture, the more the aggregate resource 
stock is boosted since expansions of manufacturing do not come at the cost of habitat. The strength of 
this second effect depends on the size of gm relative to ga.  
  Finally, we address the long–run welfare consequences.  
 
Proposition 5.5 (Tariff’s long–run impact on welfare).  
(i)  
* 0 u¥ D > . 
(ii)   sign u¥ D  is ambiguous. 
 
Although the impact of the tariff on 
* s  is ambiguous, 
* * / r h s  increases. This means that search costs 
in Foreign fall, and hence the tariff mitigates the search externality. For Home, the long–run welfare 
consequences  are less clear–cut, as it faces increased harvesting costs which may or may not be 
compensated by the inflow of tariff revenues. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
  Many renewable natural resources are harvested under de facto open access. This implies that in 
autarky harvesting levels exceed their socially optimal levels. Absent well-enforced property rights, 
trade liberalization may not be welfare–improving. It enhances the profitability of resource harvesting 
in countries with a comparative advantage in that activity, and hence exacerbates the within–industry   24
externality arising from the lack of property rights. Indeed, in their seminal paper, Brander and Taylor 
[6] conclude that (i) trade liberalization does not enhance welfare in all countries involved, and (ii) 
trade  barriers  imposed  by  countries  with  a  comparative  disadvantage  in  resource  harvesting  are 
welfare–improving.  
  In this paper, we have extended Brander and Taylor’s model by introducing economic  and 
ecological  interdependencies  between  the  renewable  natural  resource  and  one  type  of  economic 
activity, agriculture. The ecological interdependency is a negative one; habitat, be it defined in terms 
of quality or in terms of quantity, is one of the main determinants of the long–run viability of many 
renewable natural resources, including fauna and flora, and agriculture takes place at the expense of 
habitat through claims on land or by degrading its quality (e.g., via pesticide use or, more general,  
pollution).  The  economic  interdependency  concerns  the  impact  of  habitat  on  harvesting  costs: 
spreading the resource stock over a larger habitat means that resource harvesting costs increase due to, 
for example, increased search costs. That means that we should not only consider the within–industry 
externality arising from the lack of effective property rights, but also the (positive  and negative) 
externalities between agriculture and harvesting activity. 
  These across–industry externalities imply that the clear–cut results obtained by Brander and 
Taylor  [6]  no  longer  hold.  First,  whereas  Brander  and  Taylor  find  that  trade  liberalization 
unambiguously reduces welfare in the relatively resource–rich country (labeled Foreign), we observe 
that the results crucially depend on the role of habitat in our model. Trade may shift labor into or out 
of agriculture, depending on whether the country starts exporting agricultural goods or not. A shift 
towards agriculture reduces habitat, and yields short–run gains to the extent that smaller habitat means 
lower search costs, which is welfare–improving for the resource exporter. There are long–run costs, 
too. Smaller habitats impair carrying capacity and long–run resource stocks. Reduced habitat may also 
impose costs in terms of loss of biodiversity if species diversity is indeed positively correlated with 
habitat size as is implied by the literature on the species area curve. 
  Second, the  consequences of  Home introducing a  marginal tariff  on  resource  imports  from 
Foreign are not unambiguously beneficial, neither from an environmental perspective, nor from a 
goods consumption perspective. In Foreign, labor shifts from resource harvesting to agriculture. The   25
resulting reduction in harvesting pressure favors resource conservation. But this positive effect may 
be overtaken by the decrease in habitat (which negatively affects resource regeneration), so that the 
net impact on resource conservation is ambiguous. Because of the same considerations, the change in 
the  aggregate  resource  stock  in  Home  and  Foreign  is  also  ambiguous,  but  their  total  habitat 
unambiguously declines. 
  In short, we find that Brander and Taylor’s policy recommendations may be appropriate for 
natural  resources  such  as  high–sea  fisheries,  for  which  competition  for  space  is  absent,  but  not 
necessarily  for  terrestrial  resources.  Trade  measures  may  not  enhance  conservation  of  terrestrial 
resources in countries that are still endowed with substantial areas of habitat, that are rich in terms of 
biodiversity, and where agriculture is an important source of income. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
In this appendix we only use the superscript FT when a variable is compared with its value in autarky. 
 
Free–trade regime conditions 
(i)  0 , 0
* > = r r l l  (CHR) is an equilibrium if and only if 
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 (iii)  With  free  trade, 
* 0, 0 r r l l > >   (SHR)  is  an  equilibrium  if  and  only  if 
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* > = r r l l  is an equilibrium  if and only if Home and Foreign make nonzero and zero profits, 
respectively.  Hence 
* * / / / r r r h s p h s = £ a .  Hence,  from  (2.4)  and  (2.8),  we  may  write 
* * * * * *
m r r
r m
h l l l h s




, in which we can substitute (4.3) and 
* w w
r r r l l l = =  g . This proves (i). The 
proof of (ii) is analogous, and (iii) is an immediate implication of (i) and (ii).  
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1 ( 1)
FT FT AUT AUT
r a r a a m r m h h l h h l z z = - < = - Û < - Û > -   g hg g hg . This proves (iii). 
 
Proof of proposition 4.2 (Short–run welfare) 
By substituting (2.3), (2.10), (2.11), and pa = 1 into (2.9), we find an expression for welfare, from   28
which we calculate welfare in autarky and free trade by substituting (3.3) and (4.3), respectively. We 
find (we omit T because there is no danger of confusion): 
(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 1
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The term in square brackets reaches a minimum equal to unity for z = 1.  
To prove (i), we show that  ( ) ( )
AUT FT
r r p T p T >  so that  ( ) ( )
FT AUT u T u T > . In autarky, zero profits in 
harvesting  in  Home  and  Foreign  requires  /
AUT AUT AUT
r r p s h = a   and 
* * * /
AUT AUT AUT
r r p s h = a , 
respectively. Combining, we find 
* * * ( ) ( ) /
AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUTw
r r r r p s s p p s h + - - = a  for the 
aggregate.  In  free  trade,  non–positive  profits  in  Home  and  zero  profits  in  Foreign  requires 
/
FT FT FT
r r p s h £ a   and 
* * * /
FT FT FT
r r p s h = a ,  respectively.  Combining,  we  find  for  the  aggregate 
* ( ) /
FT FT FT FTw
r r p s s h + £ a . We write the aggregate conditions for autarky and free trade, together 
with  proposition  4.1(i),  as  [ ( ) ( )] ( )
AUT FT w
r r p T p T s T - ³
* * [ ( ) ( )] ( )
AUT AUT AUT
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* * [ ]
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* * / / h l h l <   imply 
* AUT AUT
r r p p ¥ ¥ > ,  we  have 
( ) ( )
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  For  Foreign,  we  have 
* * * *
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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r r r
FT FT AUT FT
r r r
p T h T h T s T
p T h T s T h T
= = .  Proposition  4.1  establishes 
that this ratio may either fall short of or exceed unity. If it exceeds unity, the whole above expression 
for 
* * ( )/ ( )
FT AUT u T u T exceeds unity. This proves (iii). We calculate numerical examples, in which 
we fix the following parameters h* = 4, l* = k* = l = 1, k = h = 1.5, a/r = 1, h = 0.9, ga = 0.6 and in 
which we set gr = 1 – ga – gm. For  0.2 m = g , we find a SHR and 
* * ( ) ( )
FT AUT u T u T < . For  0.35 m = g , 
we find a CHR and 
* * ( ) ( )
FT AUT u T u T > . This proves (ii). 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.3.ii (Long–run habitat) 
The steady–state free trade equilibrium is a shared harvest regime, so we have 
* * / /
FT FT FT FT
r r s h s h ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = .   29
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and using (2.4), (2.8), and (4.3), we find: 
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Hence, in the long–run shared harvest regime, we have: 
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From  (2.4)  and  (3.1),  we  have: 











.  Solving  for 
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a m m a h l h l z h l - - - - - - <     g hg hg g ,  which  we  can  simplify  by 
substituting 1 a m r - - =    g hg g  and  / / m r m r =   g g g g .  
 
Proof of proposition 4.4 ii (Long–run resource stocks)  
Using (3.2) and results from the previous proof, we may write 
* * * * * * * * * *
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For the inequality in proposition 4.4.ii, the latter expression exceeds unity. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.5 (Long–run welfare) 
The expression for  /
FT AUT u u  from the proof of proposition 4.2 applies to the long run. Since a SHR 
applies in the long run, we may substitute (2.6). This gives: 
(1 ) / 1
{1 (1 ) (1 )} .
/
r m FT FT FT
r




z u s h
-
= - - -
é ùæ ö æ ö
ê úç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷ è ø ê úè ø ë û
g g h
h g  
We  prove  that  the  RHS  of  this  expression  is  the  product  of  two  terms  bigger  than  one,  so  that 
/ 1
FT AUT u u ¥ ¥ > . First, the term in square brackets reaches a minimum equal to unity for z = 1. Second, 
from  (3.3)  and 
* * / / h l h l < ,  we  have 
* * * / / / /
AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT AUT
r r r r p s h s h p ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = < = a a .  From 
proposition 4.3.i and 4.4.i, we write this as 
* * / / / /
AUT AUT AUTw AUTw FTw FTw AUT AUT
r r r r s h s h s h s h ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ < = < .   30
In the long run, we have a SHR with  / /
FT FT FT
r r p s h ¥ ¥ = a  
* * / /
FT FT FTw FTw
r r s h s h ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = = . Combining the 
last  two  conditions,  we  find  / /
FT FT AUT AUT
r r s h s h ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ > .  This  proves  (i).  Similarly,  we  find 
* * * * / /
FT FT AUT AUT
r r s h s h ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ < . This proves (iii). For Foreign, we calculate numerical examples. With the 
first (second) set of parameter values used in the proof of proposition 4.3, Foreign loses (gains) in the 
long run. This proves (ii). 
 
Proof of proposition 5.1 (Tariff’s short–run impact on habitat)  
Totally differentiating (5.2) and 
* w
a a a l l y + = g , and evaluating the resulting equations at the free 
trade equilibrium by setting  0 = t , we find 
* *
   r r a a a h h l l + = - + = - < g G . This proves (i). 
Differentiating (5.3) and using (2.4) and (2.8), we find 
* * *
  > @ 
w
r a a r h l s s h = - = - + < g G  and 
*
  > @
w
r a a r h l s s h = - = - - g G  
* * * * ( / )[ (1 ) ] 0
w
a r a r s s h l l l = - + - + > g g g . This proves (ii).  
 
Proof of proposition 5.2 (Tariff’s short–run impact on welfare) 
Welfare  (2.9)  can  be  written  as  u=y/pc,  with  ( )/(1 (1 )) r r r y l l l = + - + - t g t g   and 
( ) Õ = =
r m a i i i c
i p p
, , /
g g . Noting that    y = G ,  0
* = Dy  and    c c r r r p p h h = g  (and similar 
for 
* * / c c p p D ),  we  find 
* * * * * * * * *
   c c c r r r p u y l p p l h h = - = - > g   because 
* 0 r h D < ;  see 
proposition 5.1. This proves (i).  
Analogously, we find    c c c r r r p u y l p p l h h = - = - G g , which cannot be directly signed as 
0 r h D > .  We  consider  numerical  examples,  in  which  we  fix  the  following  parameters: 
* 4 h = , 
* 1, h l l = = = / 2.5 = a r ,  and  0.6 a = g   and  in  which  we  set  gr  =  1  –  ga  –  gm.  For 
(0.0735,1 ) m a Î - g g , we find  0 u D < . For  (0,0.0735) m Î g  we find  0 u D > . This proves (ii).  
 
Proof of proposition 5.3 (Tariff’s impact on long–run habitat) 
Linearizing (5.2)–(5.3), (2.8), 
* w
a a a l l y + = g , 
w
m m l y = g , and 
* 0 m l =  around the free–trade steady   31
state  and  using  ( / ) r r s h l ¥ ¥ ¥ = - a r   to  eliminate  the  resource  stocks  in  (5.3),  we  find 
* *
   r r a a a h h l l ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ + = - + = - < g G . This proves (i).   
Similarly, we find 
* * * *
* * [ ( ) ] ( / )

a r r m r r
r a w w
r r





= - = - <
-
g g G r a
. For habitat at Home, 
we calculate numerical examples, in which we fix the following parameters: h = 1.1, h* = 1.2, l = l* = 
1,  / 1.5 = a r , and  0.6 a = g , and in which we set gr = 1 – ga – gm. For  (0.0371,1 ) m a Î - g g , we find 
0 r h ¥ D > ; for  (0,0.0371) m Î g , we find  0 r h ¥ D < . This proves (ii).  
 
Proof of proposition 5.4 (Tariff’s impact on long–run resource conservation) 
From  (2.4)–(2.8),  we  have  ( ) ( )
w w w w w
a a m s h l l l l ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = - - - - r r a .  Substituting 
w w
m m l y = g ,  and 
w w
a a l y = g ,  and  taking  the  first  derivative  of  the  resulting  equation,  we  find 
     
w w
m a s l l ¥ ¥ ¥ = - - a r a r   [( / )( ) ] a m a = + - a r g g g G . This expression is positive if and 
only if the term in brackets is positive. This proves (i). From  ( ) ( ) a a m s h l l l l ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = - - - - r r a  
(see  (2.4)–(2.8),  (2.4)  and 
* 0 m l = ,  we  have 
* * *
      a r s l h ¥ ¥ ¥ = - = - - a r r a r r .  From 
proposition 5.3, we see that the sign of this expression equals the sign of  r a - . This proves (ii). 
 
Proof of proposition 5.5 (Tariff’s long–run impact on welfare) 
The proof is similar to the one in Proposition 5.2, but here  ( )    r r r r r p p h h s s = - g  and 
analogous for 
*
r p D . We have 
* *
* * * * *
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because of proposition 5.3 and 
*
*
( / ) ( / )
1 1
w w w w
a r r
w w w w w
r r a a
h l l s s
h h h l h l
- +
= = = - > -
- -
g g a r a r g a
r g g
. This 
proves  (i).  Analogously,  we  find       c c c r r r p u y l p p l h h s s ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ = - = - - G g   = 
/ 1 1
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è ø è ø ë û
a r a
G g g g
r
.  Since  r h ¥ D  is  ambiguous, we study  numerical   32
examples. We fix the following parameters: 
* * 4, 1, h h l l = = = = / 2.5 = a r , and  0.6 a = g . We set 
gr = 1 – ga – gm. For  (0.1855,1 ) m a Î - g g , we find  0 u¥ D < ; for  (0,0.1855) m Î g , we find  0 u¥ D > . 
This proves (ii). 
 
                                                 
Notes: 
1 Agriculture is the direct cause of 80% of annual tropical forest loss [1, p. 69], while these forests 
provide habitat for about half of the species on earth [12, p. 41]. 
 
2 We assume that conversion of habitat to agricultural land is reversible. This is consistent with the 
broader definition of habitat  (i.e.,  unclaimed land), but less  so  with the stricter definition  (i.e., a 
specific type of ecosystem). Irreversibility is left for future research. 
 
3 This specification can be derived from a logistic specification of natural resource growth per unit of 
land,  ) / 1 ( ) ( k r v v s s g - = where sv is the density of the resource (s/hr),  0 > k  denotes the carrying 
capacity per unit of habitat area, and  0 > r  is the maximum growth rate. Normalizing  1 = k , and 
multiplying natural growth per unit of land, g(sv), by habitat size, hr, yields natural growth of the total 
resource stock. Subtracting harvest, yr, from this expression, we obtain (2.7). 
 
4If one type of economic activity negatively affects the net returns to another, trade may enhance 
welfare by spatially separating the two activities [8]. Here, in contrast, we find that spatial separation 
(of harvesting and agriculture in particular) may be detrimental to welfare due to the search cost 
externality: the economy that specializes in harvesting by letting agriculture move abroad, finds its 
resource stock spread over more habitat, faces higher search costs, and lower welfare.  
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5 We can write the sum of labor and capital income as y = wl + (1 – h)pmym = l + (1 – h)gmy, since w = 
1 and pmym = pmcm = gmy. Hence, y = l/[1 – (1 – h)gm]. Labor demand in each sector then follows from 
profit maximization and (2.10) with  a a a a p y l y = = g ,  / m m m m p y l y = = h g , and  r r r r p y l y = = g . 
 
6 This follows from the procedure in footnote 5, but now for aggregate values.  
 
7  Defining  rent  income  as  /
m m kp y k = ¶ ¶ p ,  we  may  write  from  profit  maximization  and  utility 
maximization:  (1 ) (1 ) ( )
w w w w
m m m p y wl = - = - + p h h g p . Hence,  /
w w wl p  is a constant. 
 
8 Home exports if pm cm= gmy < pmym = lm/h. After substitution of (2.11) and (4.3), this boils down to 1 
< z. 
 
9 The situation with zero harvesting in Foreign is ruled out by our assumption that h
*/l
* > h/l. 
 
10 With z = 1 (which implies z
* = 1), the manufacturing sector is not relevant for the effects of trade on 
labor allocation. The trade effects are then similar as in a model without manufacturing sector (gm = 
0). 
 
11  Note  that  we  ignore  welfare  changes  along  the  transition  path;  we  only  compare  steady–state 
results. 